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The idea for this special issue emerged through a winding (and queer) series of  conversations. 
In February 2019, in the dead of  winter, we drove to windy Quebec City together to present 
at a feminist philosophy conference organized by a friend and her colleagues. This was our 
first time presenting together and we wanted to reshuffle the expected presentation format 
and talk about what was really on our minds, together, in collaboration and dialogue. Our 
conversations at the time often revolved around our experiences living with (un)diagnosed 
mental illness.1 When we checked-in with each other via text, sent virtual “spoons” (a 
token of  energy, in crip parlance), and met for coffee, we talked about pain and unwellness, 
bad mental health days, medical appointments, changes in prescription medications, 
and the feeling of  being not-at-home in our bodyminds.2 We were—and remain—
particularly interested in how these elements affected our research both conceptually, 
in terms of  the ideas we are drawn toward, and practically, because being disabled, for 
1 We have both received various diagnoses of  so-called “mental illness” and have had varying experiences 
obtaining such diagnoses. Many of  these diagnoses are typical of  those often received by white, female-
coded patients in the psychiatric-industrial system today. While we do not explore these questions at 
length here, much excellent work discusses issues of  Mad and disabled (dis)identification in ways that we 
find illuminating and comforting, including Johnson 2010; Price 2011; Samuels 2003; and Schalk 2013.  
2 Christine Miserandino coined the “spoon” metaphor in an essay titled “The Spoon Theory” (2003). 
Miserandino employs the metaphor to describe to a friend the energy-consuming effects of  daily tasks 
when living with chronic illness. Spoons indicate the limited units of  energy that disabled and chronically 
ill folks have available to go throughout the day. When spoons are running low, they need to be recharged 
(e.g., by resting, canceling plans, or receiving care). 
Disability studies scholar Margaret Price introduced the notion of  bodyminds in her 2015 article “The 
Bodymind Problem and the Possibilities of  Pain.” Price’s use of  this term rejects our tendency to think 
about bodies and minds in dualistic terms. Because it rejects this artificial, second-order distinction, 
in favor of  our felt experience of  our bodies, this notion is particularly ripe for a phenomenological 
analysis of  experiences of  illness, madness, and disability. The term has since been widely adopted 
by disabled communities and was recently employed in Sami Schalk’s excellent Bodyminds Reimagined: 
(Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women’s Speculative Fiction (2018).  
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each of  us differently, means managing unexpected flare-ups of  pain the day before an 
important deadline, losing a day in a psychiatric emergency room, feeling too ill to read 
and write, dealing with panic attacks at academic conferences, or not making it to the 
conference at all. In an early email about submitting a proposal for the Quebec City 
conference, Corinne observed how strange it was to write conceptually about realities that 
are also conspicuously felt and material for them: “I guess it’s also a point we’re trying to 
make in this presentation, but it’s still difficult.” Emily agreed: the past few months had 
been particularly challenging in concrete and everyday ways, and yet they “could not but 
write and think about madness.”
Our presentation that February explored how illness, which at the time felt like the 
appropriate vocabulary to describe what this special issue now calls sickness (more on 
this later), un/made traditional conceptions of  subjectivity, temporality, spatiality, and 
embodiment. For this task, and given our philosophical trajectories and inheritances, 
phenomenology seemed like the obvious place to start. From its inception in Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations (1970), the field of  phenomenology has developed a rich conceptual 
vocabulary and a rigorous methodology to describe human experience as it is lived, without 
prejudices or assumptions. Phenomenology’s focus on the transcendental structures of  
everyday experience reveals commonalities across our ways of  accessing the world as a 
meaningful milieu. We argued in our presentation that phenomenology also offers us 
important tools to study the meaning and lived experience of  illness beyond the narrow 
scope of  a biomedical framework. Take, for example, phenomenology’s sustained interest 
in corporality. Corporality is an ostensibly “universal” feature of  human experience and 
thus it functions historically within phenomenology as a springboard for the distillation of  
the meaning of  our everyday lives. For Husserl (1989) and for Merleau-Ponty (2012), we 
must distinguish between our body as a neurobiological entity (Körper) and our body as it 
is experienced (Leib). The lived body, as Husserl explains it, determines our “near sphere” 
or “primordial core sphere” (1989, 149-150). Put another way, it is the “here” from which 
we encounter the world, our zero-point of  orientation. Our lived body is our means of 
having a world and being-in-the-world. Phenomenology is borne by this originary relation 
of  inhabitance and body-world reciprocity. 
When it is employed to analyze particular human experiences, we view the Körper/Leib 
distinction as an invitation to re-orient philosophical analysis toward first-person accounts 
of  illness, madness, and disability. From an ethical viewpoint, we must remain attentive 
to the contrasts between first-person accounts and biomedical assessments, priorities, and 
decisions, including normatively laden medical assessments of  quality of  life (Reynolds 
2018; Stramondo 2020). The recorded disparities between patient experiences and medical 
etiology map onto urgent concerns about the place given to the voices and experiences of  
those immediately affected by illness, madness, and disability in medical discourse, and 
the perceived illegitimacy of  their epistemic claims (Kidd and Carel 2017, 2018). Finally, 
a phenomenological approach also highlights the existential importance of  meaning (or 
sense) in our lives, and its elision from most biomedical frameworks. Illness, madness, and 
disability transform how we orient ourselves in everyday lifeworlds; these experiences may 
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render alien and uncanny our understanding of  ourselves and of  others, thus shifting how 
we make sense of  things. A phenomenological approach turns our attention toward the many 
orientations and disorientations that these experiences prompt, the moments of  doubt, loss, 
joy, grief, pain, solidarity, and clarity that make up ill, Mad, and disabled lives.
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s foundational phenomenological forays mainly pursued 
structures of  experience that were not only common or shared, but also “universal.” Yet, 
as our presentation in Quebec City highlighted, these claims to universality have since 
been contested. In particular, feminist phenomenologists have rejected putatively universal 
accounts of  embodiment in favor of  analyses considering how “oppression, power, and 
privilege may form the horizon wherein [. . .] experience is situated and historicized” (Al-
Saji 2017, 143). Our everyday lifeworlds are shaped by social, political, cultural, affective, 
and historical circumstances that inflect what we are oriented toward and the “here” from 
which we encounter objects, others, and environments. A too-broad focus on universality 
threatens to reproduce harmful assumptions about what counts as universal and to erase 
minoritized identities from our analyses in the process. By revealing a richer breadth of  
embodiments and perspectives than those offered by earlier phenomenologists, feminist 
phenomenologists have produced important analyses of  the multiply situated ways in which 
people of  all genders encounter the world. The work of  feminist, critical race, and queer 
phenomenologists reveals that our bodies are positioned along different axes of  power that 
determine what counts as “normal.” The long-standing privilege of  the able-bodied, white, 
middle-class, cisgender male subject is slowly giving way. In its place, phenomenologists 
(and philosophers, more generally) are finding a rich variation of  bodyminds whose lived 
situations and horizons greatly vary. 
A second important lesson of  feminist phenomenology is that we must pay closer 
attention to aspects of  embodied life that have been cast as deviant, deficient, or flatly 
non-philosophical. In recent years, this provocation has led to analyses of  such diverse 
phenomena as illness and psychopathology (Carel 2016; Fisher 2015; Lajoie 2019a; 
Wilkerson 2014), sexed embodiment and sexuality (Heinämaa 2010; Zeiler and Guntram 
2014), pregnancy and childbirth (LaChance Adams and Burcher 2014; Heyes 2012; 
Oksala 2016; Young 2005), aging and death (Cuffari 2011, 2014; Weiss 2017), biomedicine 
and medicalization (Dolezal 2010; Wieseler 2018; Zeiler and Käll 2014), and disability 
(Diedrich 2001; Salamon 2012; St. Pierre 2015). These phenomena, in fact, are deeply 
philosophical: they provide a critical foil for the unexamined ideal of  normate embodiment 
and reveal to us that the course of  human experience is neither exclusively oriented, nor 
entirely or even primarily predictable, autonomous, and voluntary.3 
As inheritors of  this legacy of  work, we continue to ask: why have early phenomenologists 
taken so long, or been so reluctant, to investigate disability, illness, and madness as inherently 
valuable forms of  existence? Rather than employing these experiences as exemplary 
of  breakdowns or deviations in the course of  human life, how can we view them as 
3 For details on the conception of  normate, access Garland-Thomson (2017) and Reynolds (2019).
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“complete forms of  experience” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 110) or points of  departure for what 
Joel Michael Reynolds (2017) aptly terms a crip phenomenology? Why have these 
experiences so often been framed as mere limit cases for describing “normal” embodiment 
and consciousness? Lastly, and speaking more directly to the purpose of  this special issue, 
how do “the complex textures of  social life” transform the ways in which we feel ill, disabled, 
and Mad (Guenther 2013, xiii)? In particular, the impulse for this special issue grew from a 
certain uneasiness (or a dis-ease) with the lack of  intersectional framing and interdisciplinary 
focus of  most existing phenomenological research on illness and disability.4 While there 
exists much excellent work on gendered conceptions of  health and ability, considerations of  
race, class, size, sexuality, and nationality are only rarely and cursorily addressed. Indeed, 
on closer inspection, and as others have pointed out, social positionality and lived realities 
of  privilege and oppression are often bracketed out of  phenomenological analyses of  illness 
and disability (Wieseler 2017, 2018). To our knowledge, there has been no collection of  
work, special issue or philosophical volume dedicated to phenomenological examinations 
of  illness, madness, and disability which centers issues of  oppression, power, and privilege 
beyond the category of  gender. And, while scholars outside of  phenomenology have 
shown interest in cross-pollinations with phenomenology (e.g., Mad and disability scholars 
using phenomenology), phenomenologists themselves have been less likely to integrate 
and contribute to lively political, theoretical, and ethical debates emerging from Mad and 
disability scholarship and activism. Our concerns with these limitations are central to this 
special issue. Moving forward, we need phenomenological analyses that do not gloss over 
the crucial significance of  structural injustice and oppression in our lives, but rather examine 
their role in shaping how illness, madness, and disability are lived, diagnosed, distributed, 
perceived, and produced. Phenomenology can become a germinal site for the study of  such 
varied topics as care work and vulnerability, political agency and representation, access 
and inclusion, medical racism, and past and current histories of  forced institutionalization, 
sterilization, and incarceration of  disabled and Mad people. To embark on this task, 
however, a critical method is needed. 
We understand the critical in critical phenomenology to mean at least two things. 
The first concerns the importance of  interdisciplinary dialogue; the second addresses the 
methodological limitations of  classical phenomenology. Regarding the latter, we view critical 
phenomenology as a growing project that gathers phenomenologists of  various horizons 
around a developing set of  scholarly orientations that also function as dis-orientations of  
the tradition. Critical phenomenology breathes new life into problems and questions that 
are familiar to the phenomenological tradition by taking them astray, away from straight 
and narrows paths. In this sense, we view critical phenomenology as a queer enterprise, in 
the sense given by Sara Ahmed (2006) to this term. By putting phenomenology to queer 
use and steering it in new directions, critical phenomenology also asks how phenomenology 
has been used such that, much like the phenomena it studies, it, too, has a tacit background 
4 The political category of  madness is more rarely taken up by phenomenologists, who tend to work with 
the notion of  mental illness or mental disorder.
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that has largely become taken-for-granted. For this reason, Lisa Guenther writes that 
the ways in which we see and make the world require “a sustained practice of  critical 
reflection” (2019b, 12). We believe that this practice of  reflection must examine both 
worldly phenomena and the ways in which the lifeworlds that contain them are instituted 
and maintained, including our own intellectual lifeworlds. Alongside Guenther, we hold 
that as a philosophical and a political practice, critical phenomenology must pursue the 
“illumination and transformation” of  systems of  domination (e.g., racism, capitalism, 
heteropatriarchy, ableism) that have long been normalized and naturalized as simply the 
way things are—thus receding to the background (2019b, 15). Rather than starting from 
the assumption that these systems are irrelevant to phenomenological analysis, a critical 
approach interrogates their role in the creation and maintenance of  intellectual traditions, 
social worlds, and intercorporeal experiences. 
This brings us to the question of  interdisciplinarity. An important contribution of  recent 
work in critical phenomenology has been its willingness to integrate insights from a variety 
of  fields, including cultural sociology (Melançon 2014), critical prison studies (Guenther 
2018; Pitts 2018), political theory (Ahmed 2019), human geography (Kinkaid 2020), 
aesthetics and visual studies (Al-Saji 2019; Ortega 2008, 2019), environmental studies 
(Christion 2019), queer and trans theory (Salamon 2010, 2018), critical whiteness studies 
(Ahmed 2007; Guenther 2019a), and decolonial theory (Whyte 2016). This interdisciplinary 
work showcases the unique value of  the phenomenological toolkit at the same time as it 
refines our awareness of  its limits and indicates avenues of  potential growth. To this end, 
our aim with this special issue was to encourage interdisciplinary work that considered the 
contributions of  Mad and disability scholarship, alongside other fields of  critical inquiry, to 
the phenomenological study of  illness, madness, and disability. As intellectual projects that 
are rooted in grassroots activism and social critique, these fields have the potential to sharpen 
phenomenology’s foundational methodological tools. In recent decades, Mad and disability 
scholars have produced some of  the most important research on modern conceptions of  
health, sanity, and normalcy. These scholars study illness, madness, and disability not as 
individual tragedies, but as worldly experiences that have been systematically devalued 
and stigmatized. Recent work has also exposed the sexed, gendered, classed, and racial 
distribution of  vulnerability and debility as a central feature of  contemporary bio- and 
necropolitics (Ben-Moshe 2020; Erevelles 2014; Puar 2017; Tremain 2017). The insights 
developed by Mad and disability activists and scholars are momentous and they must be an 
integral part of  future phenomenological conversations about sickness. 
Our use of  the term sick in this special issue is intentional and responds to the concerns 
we have outlined thus far. The notion of  “sickness” became a focal point of  our discussions 
after our presentation in Quebec City. We both used the notion colloquially, at the time, 
to discuss how our bodyminds felt out of  synch with dominant expectations of  sanity and 
productivity: sick as deviance from the norm and as a willful refusal to be well, if  “being 
well” meant falling in line. Today, we use the notion of  sickness conceptually and colloquially 
to draw connections between experiences of  illness, madness, and disability within a critical 
phenomenological framework. This is not to say that these experiences are either mutually 
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exclusive or strictly synonymous: they are neither of  these things. We also do not intend any 
of  these notions to function as a placeholder for the others; caution is required as the rhetoric 
of  similarity or dissemblance can inform a politics of  sickness that further disenfranchises 
and oppresses marginalized peoples. When thinking and writing about these experiences, 
we must remain carefully attentive to the phenomenological and political particularities of  
illness, madness, and disability. With this caveat in mind, we choose to talk about sickness 
to honor the many coalitional alliances formed between Mad, disabled, and ill folks. Our 
use of  the term “sickness” also challenges the ways in which illness and disability have been 
deployed within phenomenology mainly in isolation from critical examinations of  ableist 
and sanist norms and normalizing labels of  somatic and psychiatric normalcy.
In their 2019 Symposium article, “A Critical Phenomenology of  Sickness,” Corinne 
suggests that sickness functions as a disruptive analytic for the traditional phenomenological 
dyad of  illness and disease, which is widely employed in the literature (Carel 2016; Leder 
1990; Svenaeus 2019).5 Most traditional phenomenological approaches to illness view the 
distinction between illness and disease as conceptually contiguous with, respectively, the 
body as it is experienced by ill patients and the body as a medical object of  scrutiny. One 
is diseased, for example, when she is medically diagnosed with a “natural” dysfunction 
through empirical observation. Illness, on the other hand, captures what it is like and what 
it means to the ill person to live with disease (Lajoie 2019b, 50-51). In turning to the notion 
of  “sickness,” we are not claiming that this phenomenological distinction is unhelpful or 
unimportant. However, the vocabulary of  illness and disease alone does not highlight the 
intersubjective phenomenology of  our social and material lives, including the ways in 
which experiences of  bodily difference are framed by systems of  power, exploitation, and 
oppression. Our use of  “sick” refuses this depoliticization of  experiences of  illness, madness, 
and disability. Thus, the deeper point that follows from its terminological addition to the 
dyad of  illness and disease is that being “sick” is a political experience in ableist, racist, 
sexist, sizeist, and classist social worlds. Similarly, Emily’s dissertation and current research 
ask how the ascription of  agency, potential, or resistance to “sick” bodies is conditioned 
both by their lived experience and by the sociogenic roots and treatment of  much disability, 
debility, and madness. We both believe that we must analyze the structures that sicken us 
and keep us sick, as well as their sustained normalization. Without this practice of  critical 
reflection, we risk forgetting that sickness is neither a “natural” fact of  the body, nor a 
“natural” feature of  contemporary lifeworlds.
A final clarification is in order. Our concern with the social architecture of  illness, 
madness, and disability is not meant to frame these experiences as social constructions 
(Douglas 2018). A critique of  socially disabling and debilitating environments should never 
dislodge the recognition and analysis of  the complex—and often understated—scope of  
pain, grief, and agony that sickness may prompt (Hedva 2016; Mollow 2014). Being sick 
5 A notable exception to phenomenological tradition’s focus on illness and disease is Kevin and James 
Aho’s (2009) discussion of  sickness. Although they make a different use of  the notion of  sickness, their 
discussion of  deviance in relation to sickness bears some similarities with our approach.
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can lead to existential insecurity and suffering, especially in the face of  violent economies of  
care and vulnerability. To modify a brilliant formulation by Merri Lisa Johnson and Robert 
McRuer, “the sensory experience of  [disability, illness and madness], what it feels and looks 
like [to be a ‘sick’ subject]” is intrinsically linked to and cannot be detached from “the 
body politics of  [these experiences], how [they operate] as a cultural location of  stigma 
and defiance, marginalization and collective organizing” (Johnson and McRuer 2014, 134). 
The intertwining of  these elements is central to our use of  “sick.” 
The articles in this special issue follow illness, madness, and disability along distinct 
conceptual, methodological, and historical axes. By being brought together, they tell a 
story about sickness that is anchored in the complexity of  ill, disabled, and Mad existence. 
In “Shifting the Weight of  Inaccessibility: Access Intimacy as a Critical Phenomenological 
Ethos,” Desiree Valentine investigates the phenomenological implications of  disability 
activist Mia Mingus’s concept of  access intimacy. As Valentine explains it, Mingus’s 
conception of  intimacy invites a reconsideration of  dominant, rights-based frameworks 
for thinking about access and draws into focus the everyday forms of  relating and belonging 
between disabled and non-disabled people that birth accessibility and inaccessibility. 
Access, then, is not simply about checklists and guidelines. It is a way of  relating to and 
with others in transformative ways. Drawing on Kym Maclaren’s account of  ontological 
intimacy as intercorporeal encroachment, Valentine asks how we can harness the 
transformative potential of  this encroachment to promote the greater freedom, agency, 
and becoming of  others. 
Through an analysis of  the phenomenology of  containment, Kirsten Jacobson, 
too, offers insights into human becoming through an analysis of  spatial and existential 
agency. In “Spatiality and Agency: A Phenomenology of  Containment,” she examines 
forms of  containment that are constitutive and nurturing, on the one hand, and forms 
of  containment that oppress, hinder, or block the exercise of  our freedom, on the other. 
As Jacobson observes, the world around us can be supportive of  our growth and agency 
or it can be hostile and threatening. This claim is illustrated by her analysis of  disabling 
physical containment—and engulfment—in modern prisons. Jacobson’s essay illustrates 
how our existential health can be compromised by environments that violate the relational 
and dynamic features of  human agency. 
Critical phenomenology can be particularly helpful for drawing links and connections 
between structures and apparatuses of  power, pathologization, and distress. Sujaya 
Dhavantri’s “The Violent Origins of  Psychic Trauma: Frantz Fanon’s Theory of  Colonial 
Trauma and Catherine Malabou’s Concept of  the New Wounded” forcefully asks us 
what happens when an event is so shocking that we shatter, considering specifically the 
event (and ongoing structures) of  colonialism. Drawing on Frantz Fanon’s analyses of  the 
“psychopathologies” of  colonized peoples, Dhavantri argues that the wound is first, central 
to understanding the various disorders of  colonialism, and second, a bridge to connecting 
psychic trauma with contemporary neuropsychiatric analyses of  “cerebrality.” Dhavantri’s 
paper thus crosses through phenomenology, discussions of  transformative experience, and 
the constructions and destructions of  trauma.  
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Finally, the shorter musings in this special issue explore the themes of  this special issue 
in a less conventionally academic, more exploratory and personal format. We provided 
the invited authors of  the musings with the following prompts to reflect on: What does 
it feel and look like to be a “sick” subject? How can critical phenomenology engage with 
discussions around illness, madness, and disability? What are its possibilities and where 
are its limitations? Lastly, what is the role of  first-person narratives in a phenomenological 
disability studies approach? The answers that Thomas Abrams, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, 
Lauren Guilmette, Shayda Kafai, and Joshua St. Pierre offer in their musings should also 
be read as provocations: they invite us to expand both our thinking about sickness and our 
ideas about what constitutes academic writing.
This special issue is timely for many reasons, with the most manifest of  these also being 
the most unexpected and upsetting. When we first started thinking about a special issue 
on critical phenomenological approaches to illness, madness, and disability in early 2019, 
we could not anticipate the extent to which a global shift toward the unpredictability of  
crip time would define the course of  this project. In the past few months, the COVID-19 
pandemic has rapidly unraveled all of  our agendas and exacerbated pre-existing social 
inequalities. It comes as no surprise that the health crisis has impacted most drastically 
low-income, undocumented, incarcerated, disabled, ill, Mad, and racialized persons (with 
these categories, of  course, often overlapping). Among other alarming realities, the ongoing 
pandemic unmasks our dependency on and abuse of  health-care workers (for example, 
in long term care facilities) and of  other, much less publicly valued frontline “essential” 
workers.6 The pandemic has also thrown into sharp relief  pre-existing racial and gendered 
inequities and class divides in higher education. It has exposed the deep-seated ableism of  
institutions willing to deploy material and financial resources that have long been denied to 
disabled students now that the able-bodied world is under threat. This pandemic sharply 
highlights who is made sick, kept sick, or denied suffering. 
I, Corinne, am writing from a white middle-class position, as a femme-coded disabled 
queer with access to health insurance through my institutional affiliation in a large R-1 
university. I am still able to afford psychiatric medication and therapy, which I need now 
more than ever, given how deeply distressing this crisis has been. I, Emily, am a white, lower-
middle-class disabled queer femme. I live in Canada and have access to health coverage, 
but I am also enrolled in a doctoral program with limited funding for students past the 
fourth year—a crack in the system that existed before the virus and will continue to exist 
long after it, with no additional financial aid planned for graduate students in light of  the 
current situation. The lockdown has affected my daily life in ways that exacerbate my 
madness, my repetitive strain injury, and my sense of  isolation from academic community. 
6 In both Canada and the United States, there has been considerable loss of  life due to the coronavirus 
in long-term care facilities, exposing many additional health and safety issues. See Béland and Marier 
(2020) for an account of  policy issues in addressing the vulnerability of  seniors in long-term care facilities 
in Canada. See Hold, Ramos, and Mahmoud (2020) for a brief  summary of  the challenges that the 
coronavirus is posing to patient well-being and experience in the United States. 
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Neither of  us has lost their income or health coverage and this has largely made possible 
our bringing this project to completion.  
As provinces and states begin to reopen, ableist, racist, sexist, and classist frames of  
disposability determine the terms of  deconfinement. Those whose lives have been made 
expendable during this crisis may never fully recover from it or survive it. While we have been 
talking about disabled, Mad, and ill life since the beginning of  this introduction, we have 
only spoken indirectly of  the deaths that routinely result from its sustained oppression. For 
those whose survival is an act of  embodied resistance, the question of  death is unavoidable. 
We are being asked today to expect and even welcome the “unavoidable” deaths of  many 
in order to preserve the “well-being” of  the economy and to uphold law and order. As 
we write this introduction, anti-racist protestors are restlessly occupying the streets to call 
for the disarming, defunding, and disbanding of  the brutal police and social forces that 
murder Black lives and keep those alive in a constant state of  near-death debility. We must 
ask ourselves: who gets sick when the economy gets healthy? How do political and health 
crises reinforce each other? How do societies decide who gets to be “sane” and who gets 
to be “healthy”? How can we develop liberatory ways of  thinking about illness, madness, 
and disability, and dismantle the systems that make and keep some of  us sick? Wherever it 
finds its readers, we hope that this special issue generates these and similar questions. There 
remains much to be said about what it means to be sick and how we can think and write 
about sickness in ways that nourish our bodyminds, our work, and our movements. We 
welcome future work around these questions with enthusiasm and curiosity. We hope that 
crip brilliance and solidarity will increasingly inform how we transform the world.
One last note. We lost many wonderful contributors to unexpected new duties and life 
shifts due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While they could not contribute to this special issue, 
we want to hold some space for them in this introduction. There will always be absences 
in the margins of  scholarly projects; we look forward to reading their work through other 
pathways soon. Finally, we wish to extend our warmest and most sincere thanks to our 
generous reviewers, to the authors who have contributed their labor and ideas to this special 
issue, and to the editors of  Puncta, for believing in the importance of  this project and for 
giving it a home.
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